The New Zealand Stock Exchange's (NZX) continuous disclosure listing rules have operated with statutory backing since 1 December 2002. Under the new continuous disclosure regime, an NZX-listed issuer is required to immediately release any material information once becoming aware of it. While the NZX takes the primary responsibility for monitoring its own listing rules, the statutory sanctions provide an enforcement regime to be implemented by either the Securities Commission with its prosecutory role, or any other person with an interest in any contravention of the statutory sanctions. If the statutory sanctions are effective, a better informed market -a market in which all material information must be released on a timely basis should be observed, which ultimately enhances investor protection. To test the effectiveness of the new continuous disclosure regime on the quantity, quality, and timeliness of public disclosures, we compare the changes in quantity (frequency), quality (precision and accuracy), and timeliness (horizon) of management earnings forecasts provided in company documents lodged with the NZX before and after the introduction of statutory sanctions.
The New Zealand Stock Exchange's (NZX) continuous disclosure listing rules have operated with statutory backing since 1 December 2002. Under the new continuous disclosure regime, an NZX-listed issuer is required to immediately release any material information once becoming aware of it. While the NZX takes the primary responsibility for monitoring its own listing rules, the statutory sanctions provide an enforcement regime to be implemented by either the Securities Commission with its prosecutory role, or any other person with an interest in any contravention of the statutory sanctions. If the statutory sanctions are effective, a better informed market -a market in which all material information must be released on a timely basis should be observed, which ultimately enhances investor protection. To test the effectiveness of the new continuous disclosure regime on the quantity, quality, and timeliness of public disclosures, we compare the changes in quantity (frequency), quality (precision and accuracy), and timeliness (horizon) of management earnings forecasts provided in company documents lodged with the NZX before and after the introduction of statutory sanctions.
We select the eight-year period from financial report period ending on 31 January 1999 to financial report period ending on 31 December 2005 as our study period, which covers roughly four and a half years pre-statutory sanctions and three and a half years post-statutory sanctions. Across this study period, we identify 720 management earnings forecasts in the 2677 documents related to 632 firm years released by 94 NZX-listed firms. The earnings forecast data extracted from the documents are then examined for changes in the quantity (frequency), quality (precision and accuracy), and timeliness (horizon) using both univariate and multivariate statistical procedures. The multivariate procedures control for time-series dependency and firm-specific characteristics (i.e. firm performance, firm size, cross-listing status, and growth prospects) known to impact the disclosure decision in the absence of regulatory change.
Our results provide qualified support for the effectiveness of statutory sanctions. Overall, disclosure frequency and the frequency of non-routine disclosures have significantly increased. However, a large number of material changes in periodic earnings are either not pre-empted by an earnings forecast or are only pre-empted by an earnings forecast made in conjunction with a routine announcement. Our results are also mixed for disclosure quality. While forecast precision and forecast accuracy have significantly improved, the improvement has come at the expense of a decline in forecast horizon. Furthermore, approximately 45 percent of all earnings forecasts are still qualitative in nature. These results suggest that the impact of the statutory sanctions has fallen short of the continuous disclosure culture envisaged by New Zealand corporate regulators. Nevertheless, the positive change in managers' forecasting behaviour is superior to that observed in other jurisdictions despite the lack of strong enforcement action. These findings have important implications for corporate regulators in their search for a superior corporate disclosure regime.
Introduction
Corporate regulation has long been controversial. However, with the increasingly integrated global economy and the upsurge in corporate scandals over the last decade, there is renewed interest in the identification and implementation of best-practice regulatory frameworks (Lopez-de-Silanes, 2003; Gallery, 2006) . Corporate governance and disclosure rules have been a priority in many regulatory reform programs that have been implemented across jurisdictions (Coglianese, Healy, Keating, and Michael, 2004; Ferrell, 2004) . In New Zealand, a major regulatory reform occurred with an amendment to the Securities Markets Act 1988 (SMA). From 1 December 2002 this amendment introduced statutory sanctions to support the NZX's 1 continuous disclosure (CD) listing rules. As there is little evidence on the to the prescriptive U.S. approach, the principles-based CD approach provides managers with considerable disclosure discretion in the lengthy time period between periodic reports.
The New Zealand setting provides an ideal environment to examine the effectiveness of a statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime for a number of reasons. First, the regime was introduced only recently; hence, the formulation of the rules, and the accompanying provisions and guidance have benefited from the experiences in other jurisdictions (notably Australia) and coincided with the recent strengthening of corporate governance rules. Second, most related research focuses on the U.S. market where a strong culture of private enforcement of tort and securities laws tends to mask the impact of public enforcement.
Moreover, recent U.S. research has focused on the effectiveness on rules designed to prevent selective disclosure (Regulation FD) rather than on continuous disclosure. Therefore, the U.S.
research is of limited usefulness in informing debates about the effectiveness of continuous disclosure regimes. Third, while the New Zealand CD rules are very similar to those adopted in Australia, the New Zealand regulatory environment is significantly different. New Zealand has relatively light handed regulation and has a less litigious business environment. Indeed, there is little evidence of active enforcement of the New Zealand statutory-backed CD regime 5 compared to the recent trends in Australia 6 . Fourth, from a research design perspective, a reliable data source exists to effectively test the impact of statutory sanctions because disclosure documents lodged with the NZX are available in electronic form for a number of years prior to and subsequent to the introduction of statutory sanctions.
To evaluate the effect of statutory sanctions on the quantity, quality, and timeliness of public disclosures, we examine changes in management earnings forecasts 7 provided in company documents lodged with the NZX before and after the regulatory change. Researchers have tested the effectiveness of changes in disclosure regimes using a number of alternative measures such as changes in disclosure indices, stock price volatility, bid-ask spreads, analyst earnings forecasts, and management earnings forecasts. Of these measures, management 5 The Fletcher Forests, Feltex, and Wool Equities cases are examples where alleged breaches of CD obligations did not lead to actual prosecutions (New Zealand Press Association, 2003; Macfie, 2006; Ward, 2007a Ward, , 2007b . 6 In Australia, the recent Southcorp and Aristocat Leisure cases are important examples showing potential success of the civil penalty proceedings and class action against companies contravening the CD obligations (Golding and Kalfus, 2004) . 7 Consistent with King, Pownall, and Waymire (1990, p.113) , we define management earnings forecasts to include all "managerial disclosures predicting earnings prior to the expected reporting date".
earnings forecasts 8 have a number of desirable properties relative to alternative measures for testing the effectiveness of New Zealand CD regime. First, unlike one-off price-sensitive events (such as merger proposals), management earnings forecasts are generally applicable to all firms and can be readily evaluated ex post through periodic financial reports. Second, the NZX specifically requires the disclosure of a change in a listed entity's financial forecast or expectation under the CD rules. As a consequence, it is difficult for a company to rely on the carve-out provisions to avoid disclosure when an earnings change is probable. Third, compared with other price-sensitive issues, managers have considerable discretion over the timing, frequency, form, and precision of their earnings forecasts. The "well-defined" features which encompass both disclosure quantity and quality make them an empirically superior disclosure proxy in corporate disclosure research (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) .
We identify 720 earnings forecasts in the 2677 documents released by 94 NZX-listed firms across the full study period (including 632 firm years with ending balance date from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005). The earnings forecast data extracted from the documents are then examined for changes in the quantity (frequency), quality (precision and accuracy), and timeliness (horizon) using both univariate and multivariate statistical procedures. The multivariate procedures control for time-series dependency and firm-specific characteristics (i.e. firm performance, firm size, cross-listing status, and growth prospects) known to impact the disclosure decision in the absence of regulatory change.
Our results provide qualified support for the effectiveness of statutory sanctions. Overall, disclosure frequency and frequency of disclosures other than as part of routine communications such as mandatory periodic financial reports and periodic releases associated with repetitive events (i.e. non-routine disclosures) have significantly increased; however, a large number of material changes in periodic earnings are not pre-empted by a least one management earnings forecast and many earnings forecasts continue to be issued in conjunction with routine information releases. Our results are also mixed for disclosure quality: forecast precision and forecast accuracy have significantly improved; however, the improvement has been accompanied by a decline in timeliness for firms expecting positive earnings changes. Also, approximately 45 percent of all forecasts are still qualitative in nature. These results suggest that the introduction of statutory sanctions have not produced the continuous disclosure culture envisaged by New Zealand corporate regulators. Nevertheless, the positive change in managers' forecasting behaviour is superior to that observed in other jurisdictions despite the lack of evidence of strong enforcement. This suggests that strong enforcement action is not necessarily a precondition for achieving a change in corporate disclosure behaviour as argued in prior research.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of New Zealand continuous disclosure regime. Section 3 summarises relevant disclosure theories and describes the research hypotheses. Section 4 provides an overview of the research design.
Section 5 presents the results and the paper concludes in Section 6.
Background to the New Zealand Continuous Disclosure Regime

The Former Continuous Disclosure Regime
Prior to 1 December 2002, New Zealand securities law only required issuers to provide periodic disclosures (the filing of annual reports), episodic disclosures (e.g. the disclosure of share dealings by directors), and IPO related disclosures (Erlenwein, 2003) . Listed issuers were also bound by continuous disclosure obligations under the NZX Listing Rule 10.1.1.
Under this Rule, listed issuers had a general obligation to disclose all price-sensitive information (relevant information) once the maintenance of confidentiality ceased to have a greater value to the issuer concerned than to the public. Like most stock exchanges requirements, the NZX listing rules are purely contractual provisions that issuers accept upon listing. Like other listing rules, the NZX had responsibility for monitoring and enforcing compliance with Rule 10.1.1. The purely contractual nature of the disclosure obligation led to concerns about the effectiveness of Rule 10.1.1 10 . Specifically, the NZX's enforcement mechanisms were considered inadequate, the definition of relevant information was vague, uncertain and broad, and the rules were inconsistent with international standards (Erlenwein, 2003 (1984) 1 NZLR 699, where it was held that the NZSE was neither empowered nor required to make statutory rules for listed companies. Thus, the NZSE can vary its rules arbitrarily and it also has the power to interpret its listing rules and make rulings regarding the application of the rules. Furthermore, the NZSE's contractual agreement with listed companies did not provide a role for the Securities Commission in ensuring enforcement.
The New Continuous Disclosure Regime
The new CD regime applied from 
Hypothesis Development
The Disclosure Decision
The disclosure literature suggests a number of reasons why management may be willing or reluctant to publicly disclose information. The adverse selection hypothesis suggests that managers choose to disclose or withhold information depending on a trade-off between the associated proprietary costs and expected benefits of informing investors (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988) . From a signalling perspective, managers may disclose negative information to deter entry of competitors to the product markets (Dye, 1986; Wagenhofer, 1990) or signal the superior quality of their firms (Akerlof, 1970; Teoh and Hwang, 1991) . Managers may wish to signal the perceived inaccuracies in the market estimates of the firm's prospects (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984) and reduce the private information acquisition costs to investors (King et al., 1990) . Alignment of the market's expectations may also be a desirable objective to mitigate potential litigation costs (Skinner, 1994 (Skinner, , 1997 Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2006) or reputation impairment costs (Skinner, 1994; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Tucker, 2006) arising from earnings surprises. Voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts and other information could be used to minimise cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Botosan, 1997; Graham et al., 2005) . However, managers might also opportunistically utilise disclosure to maximize their compensation (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000) .
Collectively, the voluntary disclosure research suggests that managers balance conflicting interests in deciding to disclose or withhold information. Ultimately the decision to disclose is strategically driven and influenced by the nature of the information held by managers, incentives of managers, circumstances of the firm, and expected reaction by investors to the disclosure 18 . Intervention in the form of mandatory disclosure rules increases costs for noncompliance and leads managers to reassess their disclosure strategies. Research shows that the nature of the rule change and legal system contribute to observed variation in disclosure 18 Refer to Healy and Palepu (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) for reviews of the disclosure literature.
behaviour across regimes. For instance, the strong culture of private litigation in the U.S.
appears to precipitate the early disclosure of bad news relative to good news (Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther, 2000; Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2002) . A similar level of asymmetrical treatment of news in not observed in Canada or in Japan where litigation risk is low (Baginski et al., 2002; Kato, Skinner, and Kunimura, 2006) .
The Impact of Statutory Sanctions on the Frequency of Management Earnings
Forecasts
In the absence of research on the earnings forecasting behaviour of NZX-listed firms 19 , it is difficult to predict how statutory sanctions affected the public earnings guidance by NZXlisted firms 20 . A priori we would expect any change in disclosure practices arising from the introduction of statutory sanctions would be similar to those observed in Australia following the introduction of their statutory CD disclosure regime in 1994. The Australian findings are generally supportive of an overall increase in the frequency of public disclosures.
In an early study examining the capital market impact of the Australian statutory-backed CD regime, Brown et al. (1999) reveal that there is an increase in the frequency of price-sensitive disclosures made by the ASX-listed firms following the introduction of statutory sanctions.
However, the increase is confined to relatively small firms and for firms which are more likely to reveal bad news. However, their study only examines a relatively short period around the 1994 introduction date (from August 1992 to March 1996) in which the enforcement action is considered to be weak 21 .
In a more recent study, Chan et al. (2007) Prior NZ disclosure research only focus on voluntary disclosure in interim or annual reports (Bradbury, 1992; Hossain, Perera, and Rahman, 1995; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; Wong and Wong, 2006) . 20 Other NZ studies on the effectiveness of the regime examine a number of alternative measures including bidask spreads, stock liquidity, market spreads, analysts' consensus forecast and dispersion, stock market reaction to earnings announcements (Gilbert, Tourani-Rad, and Wisniewski, 2005; Marsden, Huang, and Poskitt, 2006; Poskitt and Yang, 2006) . 21 There is little evidence that compliance with the CD regime was effectively enforced by either regulatory authorities or shareholders until the Southcorp case in 2003 (Golding and Kalfus, 2004) .
Australian CD regime have significantly increased the level of non-routine earnings forecasts in the period after 1 January 2000 22 .
Assuming that the New Zealand regulation has had a similar impact, we would expect to see an increase in the quantity of management earnings forecasts released following the introduction of New Zealand statutory sanctions in 2002. That is, when managers become aware of material changes in expected earnings, they are more likely to release earnings guidance (on one or more occasions) to the market following the introduction of statutory sanctions. Consistent with the findings of Chan et al. (2007), we expect that the disclosure increase to be dominated by an increase in non-routine disclosures in the post-statutory sanctions period. Accordingly, we test the following hypotheses:
H1a: The frequency of management earnings forecasts in NZX announcements
increases following the introduction of statutory sanctions.
H1b: The frequency of non-routine management earnings forecasts in NZX announcements increases following the introduction of statutory sanctions
The Impact of Statutory Sanctions on the Quality of Management Earnings Forecasts
Following the decision to release information to the market, managers must then decide on the qualitative characteristics of the information they are reporting (King et al., 1990) . The qualitative characteristics of management earnings forecasts have been of recent interest to empirical researchers (Hirst et al., 2008) . These studies examine a number of qualitative characteristics of earnings forecasts including precision and accuracy. However, the findings from these studies are mixed.
Skinner (1994) categories management earnings forecasts for a small sample of U.S. firms according to decreasing levels of precision (point, range, lower bound, upper bound, and qualitative forecasts) and finds that good news earnings forecasts tend to be point or range estimates while bad news forecasts tend to be qualitative. Bamber and Cheon (1998) report similar findings. They argue that managers faced with a higher probability of being sued for releasing inaccurate forecasts are likely to issue more qualitative earnings forecasts since qualitative forecasts are less likely to be inaccurate, leading to lower probability of being 22 In the period immediately following the introduction of statutory sanctions in Australia, Gallery et al. (2002) observe that most earnings forecasts clustered around announcements provided in conjunction with a routine event such as the Chairman's Address or the release of a periodic report.
prosecuted. Baginski et al. (2002) find that in the Canadian market, which exacts lower legal penalties for inaccuracy than does the U.S. system, managers are likely to issue more precise forecasts that are less dependent on firm performance. Similarly, Frost (2004) documents that U.S. and U.K. managers issue fewer specific earnings forecasts and forecasts with shorter horizons compared to managers in France, Germany and Japan. Japanese managers consistently issue over-optimistic forecasts when releasing current period results, especially when firm performance is poor. These forecasts are, however, systematically corrected as the forecast horizon declines (Kato et al., 2006; Ota, 2006) .
The Australian evidence is also mixed. Based on a sample of 233 stand-alone 23 earnings forecasts made by Australian firms, Coulton and Taylor (2004) show that good news standalone earnings forecasts are significantly more precise than bad news disclosures. However, using a much larger sample and including earnings forecasts in some routine documents such as the preliminary final and interim reports, Chan et al. (2007) we also expect to observe an increase in quality of forecasts following the regime change in NZ. Hence we hypothesize that:
H2: The quality (precision and accuracy) of management earnings forecasts in NZX announcements increases following the introduction of statutory sanctions.
The Impact of Statutory Sanctions on the Timeliness of Management Earnings Forecasts
Justification for a statutory-backed CD regime is based on a belief that stronger enforcement will create a better informed market because the market will be continuously updated with material information. The disclosed information increases in usefulness to decision makers if it provides a timely indicator of future performance, irrespective of the direction of earnings news (i.e. good or bad future performance). Although the New Zealand legal system imposes lower legal penalties through weaker private enforcement than either the U.S. or Australian systems, we expect the threat of increasing public enforcement through statutory sanctions 23 Stand alone earnings forecasts are earnings forecasts which are not issued in conjunction with earnings announcements or with other major corporate announcements (e.g. major acquisition or disposal) (Coulton and Taylor, 2004; Hirst et al., 2008) .
will act as a disincentive for managers to delay the disclosure of price-sensitive information.
This leads to the following hypothesis about the timeliness of management earnings forecasts:
H3: The time horizon of management earnings forecasts in NZX announcements
is longer following the introduction of statutory sanctions.
The research on management earnings forecasts also highlights that forecast precision and accuracy need to be jointly examined with the forecast horizon. As more of the financial reporting period elapses and less time remains before the release of periodic reports, management will possess more information about the eventual outcome. Consistent with the expectation adjustment hypothesis, this greater certainty is frequently shown to lead to more precise (Baginski and Hassell, 1997; Baginski et al., 2002; Coulton and Taylor, 2004; Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2006; Chan et al., 2007) and more accurate (Kasznik, 1999; Chen, 2004; Hribar and Yang, 2006) earnings forecasts. Thus, there is likely to be a trade-off between providing better quality forecasts and more timely forecasts. We make no predictions about this trade-off, but allow for any interactions in our research design.
Control Variables
The research findings on the effectiveness of the Australian CD regime are generally consistent with the litigation cost hypothesis (Skinner, 1994 (Skinner, , 1997 . According to this hypothesis, management earnings forecasts are more likely to occur when there are large negative earnings surprises in high litigation cost environments. In support of this hypothesis, Baginski et al. (2002) reveal that Canadian managers who operate in a less litigious environment than their U.S. counterparts, release more forecasts when earnings are increasing while U.S. managers are relatively more likely to issue forecasts during periods when earnings are decreasing (i.e. during bad news periods). Likewise, we do not expect to see a bad news disclosure bias in the New Zealand low litigious environment 24 . Nevertheless, we seek to investigate this issue by controlling for the earnings direction and news.
Our hypotheses have been developed to consider the impact of statutory sanctions on the quantity, quality, and timeliness of management earnings forecasts. In developing these hypotheses, we have assumed statutory sanctions will be effective in changing disclosure behaviour in favour of compliance as has occurred in Australia. However, institutional 24 Any asymmetrical treatment of positive or negative earnings expectations would also be inconsistent with the provisions of the CD regime.
differences arising from the nature of the two markets, differences in the interpretations of the CD provisions, and differences in enforcement mechanisms may lead to variation in disclosure behaviour across the two jurisdictions 25 . For example, managers may not perceive the increased costs arising from being detected and penalised for non-compliance to be sufficiently large to outweigh the benefits gained from remaining with their existing disclosure strategies.
The costs of non-compliance are likely to increase in the level of materiality of unannounced changes in earnings expectations. When investors and analysts are surprised by large earnings changes, managers face greater potential litigation and reputation impairment costs; therefore, the magnitude of the expected earnings change is likely to be an important factor influencing management disclosure decisions (Kasznik and Lev, 1995) . These costs are likely to increase under a more onerous CD regime. Even though the threat of prosecution is low in New
Zealand, such a threat will be more likely if the unexpected earnings changes are large 26 .
Therefore, we control for the magnitude of earnings changes in testing the change in disclosure behaviour.
Also, in developing our hypotheses, we have assumed that firm-specific factors are irrelevant to disclosure behaviour. Clearly, it is not the case. Prior research has shown that firm attributes such as firm size, cross-listing status, and growth prospects impact the disclosure decision regardless of the disclosure regime. Although these factors are expected to vary cross-sectionally among NZX-listed firms, they are not expected to directly lead to a change in disclosure behaviour subsequent to the introduction of statutory sanctions. To be confident that our findings are not influenced by these factors, we include appropriate controls in our research design.
Research Design
Study Period and Sample
The eight-year period from financial report period ending on 31 January 1999 to financial 
Data Sources and Classification of Management Earnings Forecasts
The NZX listing status is extracted from the Company Information section of the IRG Forecast precision is defined as the level of specificity in the management earnings forecast.
We follow Baginski et al. (2002) and Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005) by using an ordinal coding scheme where precision is coded 0, 1, 2, and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range and point estimates, respectively. Qualitative forecasts are those where management provides a general impression about the expected performance (e.g. "we expect improved earnings performance this year"). These qualitative forecasts do not capture any precise numeric interpretation about the firms' expected performance. Open-ended forecasts are forecasts where management specifies a lower bound or an upper bound for the expected firm performance (e.g. "profit will be greater than $5 million" or "profit will be lower than $2 million"). Range forecasts contain a precise numeric range of expected firm performance (e.g.
"profit will be between $1.1 and $1.3 million"). Point forecasts are more specific, indicating a precise single numerical figure about expected performance (e.g. "net income will be $1.2 million"). In our study, forecast horizon captures the timeliness of the earnings forecast. Assuming forecasts are accurate, longer forecast horizon provides investors with information on a timelier basis. Baginski et al. (2002) define forecast horizon as the number of calendar days until period end, regardless of whether the period is an interim or annual forecasting period.
We follow the similar procedure and based on the fact that most forecasts in New Zealand relate to current full period earnings, we measure forecast horizon as the number of calendar days between the release date of the earnings forecast and the end of the current financial year.
Hypothesis Testing Procedures
The hypotheses are tested using univariate methods, and due to the expected interactions across constructs, multivariate methods are employed to jointly test hypotheses and to control for common firm-specific factors expected to impact on the disclosure decisions. 
Equations ( ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period 32 .
XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise.
31 Consistent with Lev and Penman (1990) , Rogers and Stocken (2005) , Atiase, Li, Supattarakul, and Tse (2005) , and Hirst et al. (2008) , the ERROR model only focuses on the range and point earnings forecasts due to the more straightforward measure of forecast error. 32 The market value of equity (MVE) is also used as a firm size proxy in sensitivity analysis, yielding similar findings to those reported for total assets.
MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period.
NREVENT is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast is released through a non-routine announcement and 0 otherwise.
FNUM is the number of earnings forecasts released per financial year.
The three forecast characteristic variables PRECISE1 (PRECISE2), ERROR and FHORIZON
have been shown to interact with each other (Baginski et al., 2002 (Baginski et al., , 2006 Chan et al., 2007) are therefore are included as independent variables in the H2 and H3 regression tests. FNUM is also included as an independent variable in model 3 since a greater number of earnings forecasts released per year is likely to shorten the forecast horizon of the last forecast update.
The independent variables ECSIGN, BAD, GOOD, ECHANGE, SIZE, and MVBV are those that have been commonly used in prior disclosure research (Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Baginski et al., 2002; Gallery et al., 2002; Baginski et al., 2006; Chan et al., 2007) and control for firm-specific factors that lead to differences in forecasting behaviour across firms independently of the disclosure regime. Consistent with Hossain et al. (1995) , the XLIST variable is included because a number of NZX-listed companies are also listed on the ASX and other foreign exchanges where more onerous disclosure rules have existed prior to the introduction of statutory sanctions 33 . These disclosure rules and the associated litigation risk for non-compliance are likely to lead to fewer but higher quality earnings forecasts relative to non-cross-listed companies. As cross-listed companies are not expected to have changed their disclosure policies in the post-statutory sanctions period, this group of companies provides a natural control from which to compare the impact of the new rules on domestic companies.
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test Results
Descriptive statistics and results of univariate testing procedures are provided in Tables 2 and   3 and show statistics over the full study period and the pre-and post-statutory sanctions subsamples. increase in the number of pre-emptions, the most significant increase is in the group above the 5% and below the 10% materiality threshold. The 5 to 10% materiality threshold group for positive earnings changes experiences an increase in pre-emption from 50% to 88.24%, while the group above 10% materiality threshold for positive earnings changes shows an increase of only about 7% from 49.09% to 56.25%. The negative earnings changes group exhibits a similar but less obvious trend. Thus there are still a large number of material earnings changes not pre-empted by a forecast disclosure following the introduction of statutory sanctions. Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for the control variables used in regression models.
The summary statistics for firm-specific factors reveal considerable variation across sample firms which are typical of the nature of NZX-listed firms. However, the earnings change sign, the magnitude of earnings change, asset size, and cross-listing status, except for growth prospects (as measured by the market-to-book ratio) remain relatively stable and insignificantly different across the pre/post-statutory sanctions periods.
For the forecast characteristics, Panel A shows that out of the sample of 632 firm years, 350 firm years are pre-empted by at least one forecast (FCAST1) 35 . Of the 350 forecast firm years, 103 (16.3%) firm years are pre-empted by at least one non-routine forecast (FCAST2). As expected, the significant increase in pre-emption is primarily driven by the increase in nonroutine forecasts (from 8.48% to 25.52%) rather than routine forecasts 36 . Additionally, untabulated results show that the average number of forecasts (FNUM) significantly increases for forecasting firms from a mean of 1.85 to 2.24 forecasts per year across the study periods.
34 Skinner (1994) for range, and from 18.27% to 29.83% for point forecasts). While these results are consistent with expected improvements in disclosure behaviour, contrary to expectation, the forecast horizon has declined (from a mean of 212 to 171 days for all earnings forecasts and from a mean of 132 to 126 days for the last pre-reporting date earnings forecasts) which suggests that managers are now slower at producing earnings forecasts and earnings forecast updates since the introduction of statutory sanctions 37 .
In a continuous disclosure environment where firms provide multiple earnings forecasts during the reporting period, market participants and corporate regulators are likely to be most concerned about the accuracy and timeliness of the more quantitative forecasts prior to reporting date. Therefore, to further explore the changes in disclosure behaviour, Panel C provides statistics and test results for only the last pre-reporting date range and point earnings forecasts. The results for accuracy show a significant decline in the forecast error of range and point earnings forecasts (down from a mean of 0.219 to 0.017) across the two periods.
Consistent with the results reported for forecast horizon in Panel B, the average forecast 37 Untabulated results also show a significant shift of the last forecast updates to the last quarter and the preannouncement period after the introduction of statutory sanctions.
horizon of last forecast updates decline from 124 to 89 days. Given that we include the preannouncement period (period between the balance date and the reporting date) in our measure of forecast horizon, these results suggests that in the post-CD regime, the last forecast updates tend to lose considerable timeliness to investors. The other forecast characteristics are not significantly different in pre-and post-statutory sanctions periods.
Taken together, the univariate results reported in Table 3 show that the introduction of statutory sanctions is associated with an improvement in forecast frequency, which is driven by an increase in non-routine forecasts, an improvement in forecast precision, and an improvement in forecast accuracy for the last range and point update prior to reporting date.
However, contrary to the continuous disclosure principles, the introduction of statutory sanctions is associated with a decline in forecast horizon. Also, there remains a large number of periods with material earnings changes that are not pre-empted by earnings forecasts, and where forecasts are provided, a large number of these accompany routine events and lack specificity (i.e. take a qualitative form).
Multivariate Regression Results
The results from estimating the random effects logistic and linear regression models used to jointly test the hypothesised relationships are presented in Tables 4 to 8 variable captures management's decision to pre-empt or not to pre-empt an expected earnings change with forecast disclosures to the NZX. As expected, the REGIME coefficient is positive and significant (p-value = 0.000). Consistent with the descriptive statistics and univariate analysis reported earlier, the increase in disclosure frequency is driven by both firms facing 38 Random effects models are estimated to control for biases arising from the use of repeated observations across years. However, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian test results support the use of linear regression models for the FHORIZON and ERROR models in Tables 7 and 8 . 39 Prior to estimating the multivariate models, bivariate correlations between independent variables were examined. However, none appear to be sufficiently large to suggest multicollinearity.
The Frequency of Management Earnings Forecasts (H1a)
negative and positive earnings changes (as indicated by the significant positive REGIME coefficient in both negative and positive earnings change models). Thus H1a is fully supported for both subsets of firms subject to either unfavourable or favourable earnings news 40 .
Further evidence in Table 4 earnings forecasts compared to non-cross-listed firms. Table 6 presents results obtained from estimating the forecast precision (PRECISE1) model using an ordered logit regression procedure. As predicted (H2), the results reveal a significantly positive REGIME coefficient (p = 0.000) indicating that forecast precision has improved across the regime periods. Also, the REGIME coefficient is consistently significant for both bad and good news earnings forecasts 43 . Our evidence is not consistent with Bamber and Cheon's (1998) proposition that increased litigation and regulatory activity will act as a disincentive for firms to issue more precise earnings forecasts.
The Frequency of Non-routine Management Earnings Forecasts (H1b)
The Quality of Management Earnings Forecasts (H2)
Further evident in Table 6 is the highly significant negative GOOD coefficient. Regardless of the regulatory period, this result indicates that good news forecasts are less precise than bad or neutral news forecasts. This asymmetrical treatment is consistent with the findings of Gallery et al. (2002) and Chan et al. (2007) for Australian listed firms. As expected, larger firms facing bad news expectations are more likely to issue less precise forecasts and cross-listed firms tend to make more precise forecasts 44 . Also, earnings forecasts accompanying nonroutine announcements and those with shorter horizons tend to be more precise. However, contrary to expectation, the significant positive MVBV coefficient suggests that firms with more growth prospects tend to provide more specific (quantitative) earnings forecasts. As the results are dominated by the good news sub-sample, a possible explanation is that firms facing positive growth prospects need to provide more precise earnings forecasts to convince the market of the informativeness and credibility of their forecast disclosures. Table 3 ), the significant negative REGIME coefficient (p = 0.029) indicates a decline in the timeliness of forecast updates following regime change. Although contrary to continuous disclosure principles, the results 44 Baginski et al. (2002) argue that larger firms tend to provide less precise forecasts because they garner lower benefits relative to smaller firms from greater forecast specificity. Cross-listed firms are more likely to provide more precise forecasts, especially for firms cross-listed in the ASX because ASX CD Guidance discourages the release of qualitative earnings forecasts. 45 We also examine forecast bias as measured by the signed forecast error and find no evidence of either positive or negative forecast bias in the pre-or post-statutory sanctions period.
The Timeliness of Management Earnings Forecasts (H3)
are consistent with the argument that a more litigious environment leads to managers issuing earnings forecasts with shorter horizons (Baginski et al., 2002) 46 .
Other results shown in Table 8 reveal evidence of an asymmetric treatment of forecasts based on news type. The significantly negative BAD coefficient indicates that bad news tends to be timelier than good or neutral news and this has not changed across the pre/post statutory sanctions periods. However, for good news sub-sample, the negative REGIME coefficient suggests the decline in forecast horizon is mainly driven by this group. Additionally, the significantly negative SIZE coefficient suggests that large firms issue forecasts later, but (as shown in Table 4 ) these are more frequent. This is further supported by the significant and negative FNUM coefficient which shows that as the frequency of forecasts updates increases within periods, the forecast horizon declines. The other firm-specific control variables have little influence on the timing of last forecast updates.
Robustness Check
Several sensitivity tests are undertaken to ensure the robustness of the results to various conditions and alternate specifications of variable constructs. First, interactions terms are included in the models. Models 1a and 1b are tested inclusive of the interaction variables between the REGIME variable and with one of these firm-specific factors, namely earnings change sign (ECSIGN), earnings change magnitude (ECHANGE), and cross-listing status (XLIST). All the interaction variables are reported as insignificant and the results obtained from these extended models do not reveal any significant differences to the main findings previously reported.
Second, prior research has shown that earnings volatility may adversely influence forecasting behaviour. We therefore test two alternative measures of earnings volatility in separate estimations of all models: EVOL (earnings per share volatility over the prior five financial years) and ROAVOL (return on assets volatility over the prior five financial years). Neither the EVOL nor ROAVOL coefficients are significant. Other results are not significantly different from the main findings except for the earnings change ECHANGE coefficient losing its significance. Correlation tests show that ECHANGE is highly correlated with EVOL and ROAVOL which may explain the reduced significance. These results are also consistent with Baginski et al.'s (2002) assumption that the magnitude in earnings change acts as a proxy for the earnings volatility.
Third, the models are tested inclusive of industry dummy variables for the six major industry categories: (1) materials/mining/energy, (2) technology/telecommunication/biotechnology, (3) financial services, (4) utilities/airports/airlines/ports/shipping, (5) manufacturing/healthcare, and (6) Fifth, in the ERROR model, only range and point earnings forecasts are used to measure ERROR. As a consequence, we restrict our sample and ignore the materiality of the forecast error. To address these constraints, we construct another dependent variable ACCURACY which takes the value of one if the forecast is proved ex post to be accurate and zero otherwise. A 10 percent materiality level is applied for range and point forecasts. This measure therefore allows us to evaluate the materiality of forecast error for all precision levels. In contrast to the previous findings for the ERROR model, the results from estimating the ACCURACY model do not reveal any significant improvement in the overall forecast accuracy in the post-sanctions period. The imposition of a materiality threshold for the quantitative forecasts is likely to have contributed to these contrary findings.
Sixth, we re-estimate the three PRECISE1, ERROR, and FHORIZON models after excluding neutral news earnings forecasts. As a result, we remove the independent BAD and GOOD variables and replace them with a new variable ENEWS which is coded zero and one for bad and good news earnings forecasts, respectively. The results from these three models are similar to those reported in the original models.
Lastly, we re-estimate all models inclusive of an additional variable ANALYST which measures the number of analysts following the firm during the financial year 47 . The coefficients on the ANALYST variable are insignificant for all models. The results for the remaining variables remain unchanged.
Overall, the sensitivity analyses show that the main findings are robust to various alternative conditions and specifications except for forecast accuracy. In particular, the results on the REGIME variable continue to be significant.
Conclusion
The objective of this study has been to examine the impact of a statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime in New Zealand. Consistent with the intention of the corporate regulators, we expect that statutory sanctions would increase the costs for non-compliance leading to a positive impact on disclosure behaviour. Using management earnings forecasts as our proxy for measuring the change in disclosure behaviour, we hypothesise that the quantity in 1994. These findings have important implications for corporate regulators in their quest for a superior disclosure regime. Importantly, strong enforcement action may not necessarily be a precondition for achieving a change in corporate disclosure behaviour as argued in prior research. 135 (128) 153 (132) 120 (126) -3.580** (-3.007**) (107) 124 (124) 89 (75) -2.317* (-1.924^) ^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). The pre-statutory sanctions period includes all financial years ending in the 31 January 1999 to 30 November 2002 period and the post-statutory sanctions period includes all those ending in the 1 December 2002 to 31 December 2005 period. |Earnings Change| is the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. Total Assets is the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. Error is the magnitude of forecast error measured by the difference of forecasted and actual earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. ERROR is the natural logarithm of the magnitude of forecast error measured by the difference of forecasted and actual earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. FCAST1 is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year's change in earnings is pre-empted by at least one management earnings forecast and 0 otherwise. FCAST2 is a variable taking the value 2, 1, and 0 if the current financial year's change in earnings is pre-empted by at least a non-routine earnings forecast, at least a routine earnings forecast, and no earnings forecasts, respectively. ECSIGN is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. FHORIZON is the number of calendar days between the release date of management earnings forecast and the end date of the corresponding financial year. FNUM is the number of earnings forecasts released per financial year. BAD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected negative change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. GOOD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected positive change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. PRECISE1 is level of forecast precision, coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range, and point forecasts, respectively. PRECISE2 is an indicator variable taking the value of 0 and 1 for range and point forecasts, respectively. NREVENT is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast is released through a nonroutine announcement and 0 otherwise. . ECSIGN is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. , *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Multinominal logit regression model is used where the dependent variable is FCAST2, an ordinal variable taking the value 2, 1, and 0 if the current financial year's change in earnings is pre-empted by at least a non-routine earnings forecast, at least a routine earnings forecast, and no earnings forecasts, respectively. REGIME is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial reporting period ends in the post-statutory sanctions period (from 1 December 2002 to 31 December 2005) or 0 if it ends in the pre-statutory sanctions period (from 31 January 1999 to 30 November 2002). ECSIGN is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. , *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Ordered logit regression model is used where the dependent variable is PRECISE1, a measure of forecast precision, coded as 0, 1, 2, 3 for qualitative, open-ended, range, and point forecasts, respectively. REGIME is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial reporting period ends in the post-statutory sanctions period (from 1 December 2002 to 31 December 2005) or 0 if it ends in the pre-statutory sanctions period (from 31 January 1999 to 30 November 2002). BAD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected negative change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. GOOD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected positive change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. NREVENT is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast is released through a non-routine announcement and 0 otherwise. FHORIZON is the number of calendar days between the release date of management earnings forecast and the end date of the corresponding financial year. , *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Linear regression models are used where the dependent variable ERROR is the natural logarithm of the magnitude of forecast error measured as the difference between the forecasted and actual earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. REGIME is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial reporting period ends in the post-statutory sanctions period (from 1 December 2002 to 31 December 2005) or 0 if it ends in the pre-statutory sanctions period (from 31 January 1999 to 30 November 2002). BAD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected negative change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. GOOD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected positive change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. PRECISE2 is an indicator variable taking the value of 0 and 1 for range and point forecasts, respectively. FHORIZON is the number of calendar days between the release date of management earnings forecast and the end date of the corresponding financial year. , *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. One-tailed (two-tailed) test is used when coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Linear regression models are used where the dependent variable is FHORIZON, the number of calendar days between the release date of the last management earnings forecast for the period and the end date of the corresponding financial year. REGIME is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial reporting period ends in the post-statutory sanctions period (from 1 December 2002 to 31 December 2005) or 0 if it ends in the pre-statutory sanctions period (from 31 January 1999 to 30 November 2002). BAD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected negative change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. GOOD is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the management earnings forecast indicates an expected positive change in current period earnings and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the financial year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. FNUM is the number of earnings forecasts released per financial year.
